There have also been mistakes, including what probably was a money-losing investment in IBM (IBM) shares that totaled about $13 billion. Berkshire liquidated most of that holding last year and finished selling in the first quarter. An investment in a group of leading U.S. airlines including Southwest Airlines (LUV), Delta Air Lines (DAL), and United Continental Holdings (UAL) has been good, not spectacular.
Combs and Weschler are expected to run the entire investment portfolio after you depart. That's a big responsibility. We don't know how well they have done so far with their equity portfolios. You said at the annual meeting that both are ahead of the S&P 500 over their Berkshire tenure, but you didn't comment on recent performance. Doesn't that suggest they're behind the market lately?
Their holdings probably include Mastercard (MA), Visa (V), General Motors (GM), Davita (DVA), and Charter Communications (CHTR). Why not tell shareholders how well they're doing-and how you've done? If they can't beat the market as their portfolios grow, maybe Berkshire ought to consider indexing some of its portfolio. (Combs and Weschler didn't respond to a request for comment.)
Get more flexible with acquisitions. For all of your talk about hunting for "elephant"-size acquisitions, you have landed few large deals since purchasing Burlington Northern for about $35 billion in 2010. Berkshire's only major deal since then was the purchase of Precision Castparts for $32 billion (plus $5 billion in assumed debt) in 2016. You also paid $9 billion for Lubrizol in 2011.
Now is the time to get loose of your self-imposed fetters. Lift the prohibition against participating in corporate auctions. The boards of selling companies are understandably reluctant to approve a deal with Berkshire without entertaining other offers, especially since Berkshire usually wants to pay cash, not stock. Why is Berkshire's cash better than anyone else's? Private equity firms compete on deals and produce some hefty returns. The no-auctions policy only hobbles Berkshire.
Disclose more subsidiary financials. Berkshire doesn't release financial results for Precision Castparts and many other subsidiaries. It groups Precision Castparts in a catchall category called "manufacturing" that includes other businesses.
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What do we know about Precision Castparts? Not much. Berkshire said Precision Castparts' revenue was up 6% and pre-tax earnings were off 7.5% in the first quarter of 2018, reflecting what Berkshire stated in its 10-Q was the "temporary shutdown of certain manufacturing facilities." The company didn't provide the actual earnings level, however.
You have expressed confidence in Precision's CEO, saying you would buy the company all over again. Still, Berkshire paid a full price for Precision-more than 20 times earnings. Wedgewood's Rolfe thinks that if Precision were a stand-alone public company, it might be worth less than what Berkshire paid for it.
Name Abel as your probable successor.
Abel, 56, is a more likely successor as CEO than Jain, 66, who is reserved and publicity-shy.
Abel was CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Energy from 2008 to 2018 before becoming chairman of the unit earlier this year, when he was named Berkshire vice chairman. Berkshire Hathaway Energy, with electric utility operations in the Midwest, West Coast, and Britain, would be one of the country's largest utilities with a possible market value of $50 billion if it were a stand-alone public company.
Cunningham, the George Washington University professor, notes that Abel has run a mini-Berkshire, with multiple divisions. Its headquarters staff is lean like that of Berkshire, which has just 26 people at its Omaha base. "I'd like to see Greg take a more prominent role at the annual meeting," he says.
Running Berkshire is one thing; replicating you is another matter entirely. There are some things that depend on your relationships and your global reputation. For one, a series of sweet deals over the years that benefited Berkshire might not be offered to your successor. When Goldman Sachs and General Electric wanted to raise money during the 2008 financial crisis, they turned to Berkshire in part because of the signaling effect: If Buffett is comfortable with us, we must be a safe investment.
Berkshire extracted high-rate preferred stock investments with equity warrants from General Electric and Goldman Sachs. Berkshire's most lucrative such deal probably was a $5 billion preferred-stock investment in Bank of America (BAC) in 2011 that turned into a $21 billion equity position thanks to valuable equity warrants. Bank of America probably didn't need to give away so much equity. It looks like an expensive mistake by Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan in what otherwise has been an admirable eight-year tenure.
Likewise, it's unclear if Berkshire's valuable relationship with 3G, the Brazilian investment group, will outlive you. Berkshire owes its $20 billion stake in Kraft Heinz (KHC) to its original investment in the Heinz buyout in 2013 that was engineered by 3G.
Without you, Berkshire may amount to another big pool of capital in a world awash in it. Berkshire's recent failure to reach a deal to invest $3 billion in Uber could signal this. Uber didn't need Berkshire's money on your terms and passed on a transaction. It may take another financial crisis to give Berkshire an edge.
More structural changes may be in the offing in the post-Buffett era. One longtime investor foresees the company divided into three main operating units-insurance, utilities, and industrials-with a sizable group of smaller businesses such as Pampered Chef (a cookware vendor) spun off to shareholders.
Berkshire runs counter to the strong corporate trend of simplification and focus. There are benefits to Berkshire's approach, including an immediate ability to offset any insurance losses. But a vast, decentralized Berkshire might not last for long after you, I am sorry to say.
The way the Berkshire's board operates may need to change, as well. It met only three times in 2017, the fewest number of meetings for any company in the S&P 500 except for Envision Healthcare, according to Institutional Shareholder Services. The median number of board meetings for S&P 500 companies was seven.
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What would you say in a letter to Warren Buffett? Write us at mail@barrons.com and we may publish your take. Find out more at barrons.com/mailbag.
Berkshire provides little compensation to its directors, many of whom see it as a privilege to serve with you. They get paid just $900 per meeting-the median annual S&P 500 compensation for a board member is $285,000. Berkshire also doesn't provide directors and officers insurance. Looking ahead, the board probably will need to meet more often, get compensated better, and be insured against liability. CEO pay will have to rise. You earn just $100,000 a year.
Berkshire is your baby-we get it. You took control of what was then a faltering textile company in 1965. It turned into a golden child, with its Class A shares up an astonishing 15,000-fold since.
Now, it's time to pave the way for the next generation. After all, neither one of us is getting any younger.
Sincerely,
Andrew